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ABSTRACT
In this paper we discuss fiscal and monetary policy issues facing heavily-indebted poor countries
(HIPCs) who receive debt reduction via the enhanced HIPC initiative. This debt relief program is
distinguished from previous ones by its conditionality: freed resources must be used for poverty
reduction. We argue that (i) this conditionality severely limits the extent to which the initiative
provides significant debt relief; (ii) depending on the response of monetary policy to an increase in
social spending there could be a short-run increase in inflation in HIPC countries and (iii) the keys
to long-run fiscal sustainability in the HIPCs are significant fiscal reforms by their governments, and














dfanizza@imf.orgThe enhanced HIPC initiative has acquired increasing prominence in the policy
debate in developing countries.1 As i g n i ﬁcant number of countries are already enjoy-
ing debt relief under the HIPC initiative. While an abundant literature developed
d u r i n gt h e1 9 8 0 so nt h em a c r o e c o n o m i ci m p a c to fd e b to v e r h a n ga n dd e b tw r i t e - o ﬀs,
little attention has been devoted to the macroeconomic impact of debt relief proposed
under the enhanced HIPC initiative.2 Debt relief under the HIPC initiative diﬀers
from previous major debt relief initiatives, such as the Baker and Brady plans, in that
it concerns oﬃcial rather than commercial debt and in that it imposes well-deﬁned
conditionality. In particular, it requires that budgetary resources no longer needed
for debt service be used for poverty reduction purposes. This also distinguishes the
enhanced HIPC initiative from previous oﬃcial debt relief programs.
We focus on ﬁscal and monetary policy issues connected with debt reduction under
the enhanced HIPC initiative. The issues we highlight stem from two distinguishing
aspects of the initiative’s design. First, the HIPC initiative relieves debt through for-
giveness of a substantial fraction of a country’s debt service payments. The initiative
requires that the resources freed from debt service be used to increase government
spending on poverty reduction programs.3 Second, the initiative has a ﬁnite life–
the increase in government spending and the forgiven debt service take place over
a ﬂoating period whose length depends on the country’s success in implementing a
comprehensive anti-poverty strategy.4 Given these features of the HIPC initiative we
make four main points.5
First, we argue that, due to its conditionality, the HIPC initiative actually provides
1HIPC is an acronym for heavily-indebted poor country.
2See, among many others, Sachs (1984, 1989), Frenkel, Dooley and Wickam (1989), Claessens,
Diwan and Fernandez-Arias (1992) and Fernández-Arias (1992).
3For a concise description of the HIPC initiative see Van Trotsenburg and MacArthur (1999) and
the World Bank’s HIPC website: www.worldbank.org/hipc.
4After a country qualiﬁes for assistance, the international community commits debt relief to reach
a target for the ratio of the net-present value of debt to exports (150 percent) or to government
revenue (250 percent). This assistance is delivered over a variable period during which there is
conditionality requiring increased poverty reduction spending. After a country has implemented a
comprehensive poverty reduction strategy, creditors supply, without further conditionality, “top-up”
debt relief needed to reach speciﬁc debt targets.
5In what follows we will frequently refer to the enhanced HIPC initiative as “the initiative,” its
characteristic conditionality as “HIPC conditionality,” governments and organizations providing debt
relief as “donors” and countries receiving debt relief as “recipient countries,” or simply “HIPCs.”only limited debt relief; that is, there is only a modest relaxation of the government’s
lifetime budget constraint.6 The reason for this is fairly straightforward: under the
main provisions of the initiative, the government swaps one type of spending com-
mitment for another of equal value. The modest amount of debt relief the initiative
does provide is discussed below.
Second, we argue that monetary policy makers face a trade-oﬀ between stabilizing
inﬂation and achieving permanent debt reduction. This trade-oﬀ is related to the
standard one faced by any central bank when confronted by a temporary increase in
domestic demand.
Third, we discuss three factors that can improve the ﬁnances of HIPC govern-
ments. First, if the poverty reduction programs initiated under debt relief substan-
tially increase economic activity, governments will reap additional tax revenue. We
show that under generous assumptions about the growth-enhancing eﬀects of the ini-
tiative this increase in revenue is modest. Second, there is a provision of the HIPC
initiative under which donors provide a “top-up” amount of relief that comes with
no conditionality. Typically, this amount is modest compared to a country’s initial
indebtedness, so we do not discuss it further in this paper. Third, we therefore argue
that HIPC governments must act on their own to implement signiﬁcant additional
ﬁscal reforms if they are to attain long-run ﬁscal sustainability.
Last, we attempt to rationalize the design of the initiative in an optimal policy
framework. We argue that the initiative is consistent with donors whose preferences
p u tal o to fw e i g h to np o v e r t yr e d u c t i o nb u tl i t t l ew e i g h to nd e b tr e d u c t i o no rﬁscal
sustainability. Thus, we ﬁnd it hard to rationalize the emphasis put on the latter in
public policy discussions.
Our analysis does not focus on assessing the eﬀectiveness of poverty reduction
spending in reducing poverty. Rather, we focus our analysis on the budgetary impact
o ft h eH I P Ci n i t i a t i v e .H o w e v e r ,t h ei m p a c to ft h i ss p e n d i n go no u t p u ti si m p o r t a n t
in our analysis because of its secondary impact on tax revenue. To highlight the role
of diﬀerent aspects of the initiative, we decompose its eﬀect on the government budget
into two components: the direct eﬀect, which ignores eﬀects on tax revenue, and the
6For an early analysis of the ﬁnancial impact of the HIPC initiative, see World Bank (2001).
2indirect eﬀect, which takes them into account. In measuring the indirect eﬀect, we
take as given Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) results suggesting that aid is eﬀective in
raising growth in recipient countries with good macroeconomic policies. Thus our
r e s u l t sg i v eap l a u s i b l eu p p e rb o u n do nt h ep o s i t i v ebudgetary impact of the HIPC
initiative.
In Section 1 we focus on our ﬁrst point related to the relaxation of the government
budget constraint. We illustrate the impact of debt relief with HIPC-conditionality on
ag o v e r n m e n t ’ sﬁnances using a standard model of the government budget constraint.
This model only allows us to discuss the direct eﬀects of debt relief with HIPC-
conditionality on the budget, which we argue are nil. We argue that other things
equal, after debt relief, the government must still raise the same amount of revenue,
from all sources, as it did prior to receiving debt relief.
In Section 2 we develop a simple monetary model based on the standard Cagan
money demand function, in order to fully characterize the equilibrium dynamics of
prices, inﬂation, debt and seigniorage during and after the implementation of a debt
relief initiative. In Section 3 we simulate our model under diﬀerent monetary policies.
By doing this we are able to highlight our second point. We ﬁnd that, with what
we describe as passive monetary policy, debt-relief with HIPC conditionality could
have a short-term impact on money creation and inﬂation, which would eventually be
reversed. Under what we describe as a more active monetary policy, the government
can act to stabilize inﬂation, but it can only do so by raising its long-run indebtedness
relative to what it would be under passive policy. This is because keeping inﬂation
stable requires the government to issue more new debt to sterilize the monetary impact
of the short-run increase in government spending under HIPC-conditionality.
Section 3 also explores the role of (i) any growth that results from debt relief and
(ii) additional ﬁscal reforms implemented by a HIPC’s government. We show that
both tend to improve the government’s lifetime budget constraint, and lessen the
short-run monetary impact of the increase in government spending. Under generous
assumptions about growth, we show that the indirect eﬀects of the initiative on ﬁscal
sustainability are modest. For this reason, we suggest that the essential ingredients
for lasting ﬁscal sustainability in HIPC countries are signiﬁcant ﬁscal reforms that
3are not met by reduced aid commitments from donors.
Our results beg the following question: if the HIPC initiative provides only limited
debt relief, what might the designers of the initiative have had in mind in crafting it?
Without fully articulating a model of optimal debt relief, in Section 4 we argue that,
given the initiative’s design, there is an implicit donor-side objective function that
puts a great deal of weight on the costs of poverty, while putting little or no weight
on the costs associated with high indebtedness and ﬁscal insolvency. We show how
the initiative might simply be an indirect way to ensure that increased aid ﬂows are
used to increase government spending on programs favored by donors, as opposed to
programs that might be preferred by local policy makers. While our sketched model
can rationalize the design of the initiative, it cannot simultaneously rationalize the
emphasis that, in public policy discussions, is put on ﬁscal sustainability. It is for
this reason that we presume that the limited debt relief feature of the initiative may
have been overlooked.
In Section 5 we discuss possible extensions to our model, and provide some con-
cluding remarks.
1. Budget Constraints and HIPC Conditionality
We begin by discussing the ﬁscal implications of debt relief with “HIPC-conditionality”
within a standard model of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. For
c o n v e n i e n c ew ew o r ki nc o n t i n u o u st i m e . 7 In our simple model, there is only one
good, whose price is Pt. The government issues only one type of debt, Dt,w h o s e
value is indexed in terms of that good. Thus we eliminate implicit default, through
unanticipated inﬂation, by assumption.
We assume, for simplicity, that the net real interest rate on government debt
is some constant r.T h e g o v e r n m e n t ﬁnances its interest payments, rDt,a n di t s
purchases of goods and services, Gt, in four ways: by raising tax revenue (net of
transfers), Ωt, through the issuance of base money, Mt, by receiving aid, At, or through
7In a separate appendix, available upon request, we show that this approach is equivalent to
working with the simple static accounting framework familiar to students of monetary theory and
policy.
4the issuance of new debt. The government raises funds by issuing base money via
seigniorage revenue, ˙ Mt/Pt,w h e r ePt is the price level and ˙ Mt is the time derivative
of the money stock.8 Hence, the government’s ﬂow budget constraint is given by
˙ Dt = rDt + Gt − Ωt − At − ˙ Mt/Pt, (1.1)
where all variables are measured in units of local currency.




(Ωt − Gt + At + ˙ Mt/Pt)e
−rtdt (1.2)




We interpret the HIPC initiative using equations (1.1) and (1.2). Our starting
point is to think of a working deﬁnition of a heavily indebted government. One
interpretation of a heavily indebted government at time 0 is as follows: given the
initial stock of debt, D0, and the likely paths of government purchases and foreign
aid receipts, {At,G t}t∈[0,∞), the combined present values of taxes and seigniorage








(Ωt + ˙ Mt/Pt)e
−rtdt   0.
In other words, we could think of HIPC governments as ones which, in order to
be solvent, would need to rely on either (i) signiﬁcant future seigniorage revenue,
obtained at the cost of high inﬂation, or (ii) punitively high future tax revenues. An
alternative, of course, is that the government might default on its debt. We discuss
this possibility later.
O u rn e x ts t e pi st os e ew h a tt h ei m p a c to ft h eH I P Ci n i t i a t i v ew o u l db eo n
the government’s lifetime budget constraint. To do this, we must characterize the
initiative in terms of its eﬀect on the various items in the government’s lifetime
budget constraint (1.2).
8We generically indicate time derivatives, ∂Zt/∂t,a s ˙ Zt.
51.1. Direct Eﬀects
As we described in the introduction, one feature of the HIPC initiative is that donors
forgive some fraction of the scheduled debt service payments pertaining to a gov-
ernment’s existing stock of external debt. At the decision point, which we refer to
as date 0, the present value of the existing scheduled debt service is calculated, and
is expressed as a percentage of the country’s exports. The debt relief given under
the HIPC initiative would forgive enough of this debt service to reduce this NPV of
debt-to-exports ratio to no more than 150 percent.9 To take an example, suppose the
NPV of debt-to-exports ratio at date 0 was 260 percent.10. Then, over the life of the
initiative, the country would reduce its service payments, on debt existing at time 0,
by about 42 percent in present value terms.
There are several ways we could build this kind of debt relief into equations (1.2)
and (1.1). One way would be to assume that before debt relief, D0,o nt h el e f t - h a n d
side of (1.2), takes on some value. We could then assume that after debt relief, there
is simply a change in the left-hand side of (1.2), to a new value D 
0 =( 1− θ)D0,
where θ represents the fraction of the country’s debt that is eﬀectively cancelled by
the forgiven debt service.
An alternative interpretation is that at date 0 the country receives an announce-
ment from donors stating that the present value of the future path of {At}t∈[0,∞) will
be higher by the amount θD0 (0 < θ < 1), than it would have been in the absence of
the initiative.
Notice that these two interpretations are isomorphic to one another in terms
of their implications for the remaining items in the government’s lifetime budget
constraint. In particular, under the ﬁrst interpretation the initial stock of debt is
(1−θ)D0. Holding the present value of aid ﬂows constant, this implies that
  ∞
0 (Ωt −
Gt+ ˙ Mt/Pt)e−rtdt will fall by θD0 under the debt-relief initiative. On the other hand,
under the second interpretation the initial stock of debt is D0, and the present value
9In some cases debt relief is calculated with reference to the present value of debt service relative
to government revenue.
10This was the average ﬁgure across the 22 HIPCs that had reached the decision date by 1999.
See Development Committee (2001).
6of future aid ﬂows rises by θD0. Again, this implies that
  ∞
0 (Ωt − Gt + ˙ Mt/Pt)e−rtdt
will fall by θD0 under the initiative. We ﬁnd the latter interpretation to be more
convenient notationally, and use it throughout the rest of this paper.
The next important feature of the HIPC initiative is its conditionality, requiring
that the savings from reduced debt service be used to increase social spending. We
model this conditionality as being equivalent to the government making an announce-
ment at date 0 that the present value of the future path of {Gt}t∈[0,∞) will be higher
by the amount θD0.
We refer to the eﬀects of the HIPC initiative on the paths of At and Gt as its direct
eﬀects. We have characterized these eﬀects as a change in the anticipated paths of
aid and government spending to {A 
t,G  
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t}t∈[0,∞) are the post-debt relief paths of taxes, the money supply





























(Ωt + ˙ Mt/Pt)e
−rtdt, (1.6)
where {Ωt,M t,P t}t∈[0,∞) are the paths of taxes, the money supply and the price level
that would have prevailed in the absence of debt relief.
Notice, from (1.6), that debt relief with HIPC conditionality does not relax the
government budget constraint in the following sense. To satisfy its budget constraint,
the government must raise just as much seigniorage and tax revenue after receiving
debt relief as it needed to in the absence of debt relief.





0 Ωte−rtdt,i . e .t h e r e
is no change in tax revenues induced by the initiative. In this setting, (1.6) implies
that the initiative can have no impact on the present value of seigniorage revenue. On
the other hand, depending on how monetary policy responds to increased government
spending, and depending on the timing of that increased spending, the inﬂation rate
can rise, fall, or remain unchanged in the short-run. We will see, later, in some model-
based experiments, that if there is a temporary rise in inﬂation, it will later fall below
its initial value. If, for some reason, inﬂation were to decline in the short run, it
would rise above its initial value in the long-run.11 On the other hand, it is possible
that inﬂation could remain unchanged.12 To achieve a desired path for inﬂation, the
government must choose an appropriate monetary policy. In Section 2 we will see
that the monetary policy consistent with a stable inﬂation path is an active one–in
the sense that the central bank must neutralize the monetary injection resulting from
increased government spending.
1.2. Indirect Eﬀects
Of course, eventually we must modify our analysis to take account of the indirect
eﬀects of debt relief on the budget. We do this in detail in Section 2, but here
we simply note where that analysis will lead us. Suppose that the increased social
spending required under the HIPC initiative has a positive impact on growth in
recipient countries. In this case, there will be some relaxation of the government’s
budget constraint. It will still be true that the combined present values of taxes
and seigniorage revenue will be unchanged. I.e., (1.6) will still hold. However, now
suppose the government leaves tax rates unchanged when it receives debt relief. In
this case, the present value of tax revenue will rise, allowing the present value of
seigniorage revenue to be lower. Furthermore, if there is an increase in money demand
resulting from an economic expansion, this seigniorage revenue could be raised at a
11This basic point lies at the core of models of currency crises in which governments that are
unable to close their lifetime budget constraints without resort to seignorage revenue are required to
eventually abandon any exchange rate arrangement that limits their access to it. See, for example,
Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984), Obstfeld (1986), Drazen and Helpman (1987), and
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001).
12Anticipating our later results, this would be the case if M 
t = Mt for all t.
8lower steady state rate of inﬂation. Thus, if we measured the government’s ﬁscal
health by how much inﬂation it would need to generate to close its budget, both of
these eﬀects would be beneﬁcial. In order to quantify these indirect eﬀects we need a
fully speciﬁed model, such as the one we present in Section 3.
1.3. Allowing for Default
The model we have outlined so far assumes that governments always close the lifetime
budget constraint, through raising suﬃcient taxes and seigniorage revenue. In this
section we modify our analysis of the government budget constraint to explicitly
allow for default, but we maintain our assumption that debt is denominated in real
terms. What we mean by explicit default is that the government can announce paths,
{Ωt,G t,M t}t∈[0,∞), that along with the path, {At}t∈[0,∞), lead to a violation of (1.2).
A version of (1.2) still holds, but in this version the left hand side variable, DM
0 ,i s
a measure of the market value (at the discount rate r) of the government’s future






(Ωt + At + ˙ Mt/Pt − Gt)e
−rtdt. (1.7)
Essentially, (1.7) recognizes the fact that governments often do not raise suﬃcient
funds to honor (1.2).13
This naturally leads to an alternative interpretation of a heavily indebted gov-
ernment: given the government’s announced paths for {Ωt,G t,M t}t∈[0,∞) and the
donors’ announced path for {At}t∈[0,∞), the market value of the government’s debt is
substantially lower than its face value:
D
M
0   D0.
Under this interpretation we can think of HIPC governments as ones which are unable
(or unwilling) to raise suﬃcient revenues to satisfy (1.2).
13B ym a r k e tv a l u ew ed on o tm e a nt os u g g e s tt h a tt h e r ei sa na c t i v em a r k e ti nw h i c ht h ed e b to f
HIPC countries is traded. Rather, by market value, we refer to the value of a claim to the entire
future stream of the government’s actual primary surpluses, inclusive of seigniorage revenue, using
the discount rate r to compute present values.
9How would we measure the impact of the HIPC initiative in this setting? In
the previous subsection, we gave two interpretations of the HIPC initiative. In one
interpretation, the initiative directly reduces the initial stock of debt to D 
0 =( 1−
θ)D0.I ta l s oi n c r e a s et h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo fGt by θD0. In this case, DM
0 falls by θD0.
According to our other interpretation, D0 doesn’t change, but the present values of
At and Gt both increase by θD0. Therefore, DM
0 doesn’t change either. According
to both of these interpretations the degree of the government’s “solvency” does not
change: D 
0 − (DM
0 )  = D0 − DM
0 .
We wish to emphasize that our conclusions regarding the impact of the HIPC
i n i t i a t i v eo nt h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ sb u d g e ta r en o ts p e c i ﬁc to our modeling the initiative as
an increase in aid ﬂows, with those ﬂows being used to make debt service payments.
Our results are unchanged if we introduce separate notation for the debt service
payments associated with the initial debt stock, D0, and we examine a reduction in
the magnitude of these payments.14
2. Extending the Model
In this section we extend our model so that we can describe (i) the indirect eﬀects
of the HIPC initiative on the government’s lifetime budget constraint and (ii) the
dynamic inﬂationary implications of diﬀerent policy responses to debt relief. Our
extensions consist of a money demand function, and a simple model of how debt
service savings redirected to poverty reduction spending map into increased economic
activity.
2.1. The Money Demand Function
We model the demand for local currency using the familiar Cagan (1956) money
demand function
ln(Mt/Pt)=a +l nYt − η(r + πt) (2.1)
where a is some constant, Yt represents the level of output, πt is the inﬂation rate
(i.e. πt = ˙ Pt/Pt)a n dη > 0. We do not believe that the implications of the Cagan
14In a separate appendix, available upon request, we show this in a setting where the original
stock of debt has an arbitrary maturity structure.
10speciﬁcation diﬀer substantially, in any qualitative manner, from those derived from
alternative monetary models. However, the Cagan speciﬁcation has computational
advantages.
We can use the fact that πt = ˙ Pt/Pt to derive a generic solution for the price level
under the assumption that it is a continuous function of time.15 We can rewrite (2.1)
as
pt = ηr − a +l n ( Mt/Yt)+η ˙ pt, (2.2)
where pt =l nPt.T h i si m p l i e st h a t







where we have assumed that limt→∞ e−t/η lnPt =0 .16
2.2. Allowing for Output Eﬀects
As we mentioned in Section 1, debt service savings directed to increased spending on
p o v e r t yr e d u c t i o nm a yh a v eas i g n i ﬁcant impact on the government budget through
their eﬀect on output. Let the additional government spending on poverty reduction
under the initiative be given by ˆ Gt. A simple way to allow for output eﬀe c t si st o
assume that some fraction 0 < α ≤ 1 of this spending has an investment component,
where investment is deﬁned broadly.
We denote the stock of capital speciﬁcally built by this investment as Kt. Initially
we have K0 =0 .W el e tKt evolve according to
˙ Kt = α ˆ Gt − δKt for t ≥ 0. (2.4)
To keep our model as simple as possible, we assume that the level of output, absent
debt relief, is some constant, Y , and that the level of output with debt relief is
Yt = Y + ρKt for some ρ ≥ 0. We assume that tax revenue is proportional to Yt, i.e.
Ωt = ωYt for all t.
One of advantage of our model of the output eﬀects of debt relief is its tractability.
Ad i s a d v a n t a g ei st h a tw ei g n o r es o m ec h a n n els through which the initiative might
15This is a standard assumption in any one good model where the price level and the exchange
rate must be continuous to avoid predictable arbitrage opportunities.
16This solution is easily veriﬁed by diﬀerentiating the right hand side of (2.3) with respect to t.
11aﬀect output. In neoclassical models, such as the one sketched by Barro (1997)
an increase in government expenditure on goods and services has a direct impact
o nt h es u p p l yo fo u t p u t ,s u c ha st h eo n ew eh a v ed e s c r i b e da b o v e ,b u ti ta l s oh a s
indirect wealth and substitution eﬀects that can theoretically enhance or oﬀset the
direct eﬀect in determining the equilibrium level of output. In Keynesian models
increases in government expenditure on goods and services, whether on consumption
or investment goods, can have a direct expansionary eﬀe c to no u t p u tt h r o u g ht h e
conventional multiplier mechanism. These sorts of models are beyond the scope of
this paper, but they do point out an important shortcoming of our analysis. In
the end, when we calibrate our model of output eﬀects we do so bearing in mind
these shortcomings. Our quantitative version of the model, discussed in Section 3, is
consistent, we think, with an upper bound on the possible impact of debt relief on
real activity.
2.3. An Initial Steady State
We assume that at time 0 the economy is initially in a steady state where Yt = Y ,
Gt = G, Ωt = ωY , At = A, πt = π, Mt/Pt = m = ea−η(r+π)Y . These assumptions
imply that
˙ Dt = rDt + G − ωY − A − πm.
We also assume that the stock of debt in the initial steady state is constant, so that
˙ Dt =0 ,a n d
πm + ωY = rD0 + G − A. (2.5)
This steady state version of the government budget constraint illustrates, once again,
our interpretation of a heavily indebted government. Holding G and A ﬁxed, the
higher the level of the government’s debt, D0,t h eh i g h e ri t si n ﬂation rate must be
(over the range π < 1/η, πm is increasing in π), or the more punitive its taxes must
be, to avoid default.
We should point out that our analysis does not depend in any crucial way on the
initial steady state assumption. Rather, this assumption lends us some analytical
12convenience without aﬀecting our basic message.17
2.4. Characterizing the HIPC Initiative
We interpret the HIPC initiative as an attempt to improve the ﬁscal position of the
recipient government relative to the initial steady state position. In terms of the
analysis in Section 1 we will work with our ﬁrst interpretation of the HIPC initiative
and its conditionality, though we reiterate that our conclusions are not sensitive to
that choice, which is merely notational. We ﬁrst imagine that, at time 0, an economy
is in a steady state as described by the previous subsection. Then the country receives
a previously unanticipated injection of aid that lasts until period T–this captures
the ﬁnite lifetime of the initiative, though in reality the completion date is often
uncertain. In particular we assume that
At =
 
A(1 + ψ) for 0 ≤ t<T
A for t ≥ T, (2.6)
where ψ > 0 determines the increase in aid.18 We interpret the conditionality of the
HIPC initiative as requiring that government expenditure increase by as much as the
aid ﬂow until date T.19 I.e. we assume that
Gt =
 
G + Aψ for 0 ≤ t<T
G for t ≥ T. (2.7)
Given our notation, above, this means ˆ Gt = Aψ for 0 ≤ t<Tand ˆ Gt =0for t ≥ T.
Since the increase in At, in our model, plays the role of decreased debt service
payments in the budget constraint, we assume that debtors set ψ in order achieve a
17Our assumption that the economy is initially in a steady state matters only in interpreting
the quantitative simulations, in Section 3. The post-debt relief paths of inﬂation, debt, and other
variables are invariant to whether one assumes, or not, that the pre-debt relief economy is in steady
state. Of course, comparisons between the pre- and post-debt relief paths do depend on the steady
state assumption.
18Notice that after period T aid ﬂows revert to their former levels. This ignores the possibility,
pointed to by Cohen (2001), that donors will decrease their non-debt relief aid once the HIPC
initiative is well under way. Given our results, this situation would imply a net worsening of the
government’s ﬁscal position.
19Alternatively we could assume that transfers from the government to the private sector increase
over the implementation period of the initiative. The equivalence of government purchases and
transfers would not carry over to a general equilibrium model.
13particular debt reduction target. In particular, notice that the present value of the


















2.5. The Path of Output
Our assumptions so far are suﬃcient to determine the paths of output, Yt,a n dt a x
revenues, Ωt. We have assumed that ˙ Kt = α ˆ Gt − δKt for t ≥ 0, K0 =0 , ˆ Gt = ψA
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T, ˆ Gt =0for t>T,a n dYt = Y + ρKt. With these assumptions we can

































We are now able to measure the increase in the present value of tax revenue due
to the eﬀect of the debt relief initiative on output. Using (2.11), it is straightforward
to show that the increase in tax revenue is
  ∞
0








Notice that (2.12) relates the increase in the present value of tax revenues to the
magnitude of the debt relief package.
2.6. Monetary Policy
To close the model, and describe the paths of prices, inﬂation and debt under the
initiative, we must describe monetary policy after date 0. Given that we have de-
termined the paths of At, Gt and Ωt,t h e r ea r ei n ﬁnitely many paths of the money
supply that are consistent with the lifetime budget constraint, (1.7).
14To illustrate the eﬀects of diﬀerent monetary policies, we assume that
Mt =
 
M0(Yt/Y0)eγt for 0 ≤ t<T
MT(Yt/YT)e¯ γ(t−T) for t ≥ T.
(2.13)
We have restricted ourselves to the class of monetary policies in which money grows
at a constant rate relative to real GDP, over each of the two subintervals. Within this
class of policies there are still inﬁnitely many that satisfy the government’s lifetime
budget constraint, but we focus on two interesting cases.
In what follows it is useful to have an expression for the equilibrium inﬂation rate
given that monetary policy is described by (2.13). In the appendix we show that (2.3)
implies
πt =˙ pt =
 
γ +(¯ γ − γ)e(t−T)/η. for 0 ≤ t<T
¯ γ for t ≥ T,
(2.14)
given (2.13).
Active Monetary Policy In our ﬁrst example, we call monetary policy active,
because the monetary authority tries to keep inﬂation stable across the two intervals:
0 ≤ t ≤ T and t>T. I.e. the monetary authority chooses γ and ¯ γ so that πt =¯ π,f o r
all t ≥ 0, for some constant ¯ π. From (2.14) it is clear that this requires πt =¯ π = γ =¯ γ
for t ≥ 0. In doing this, the monetary authority must ensure that the government’s
lifetime budget constraint, (1.2), is satisﬁed. Notice that (1.2) can be rewritten as
  ∞
0




(πm − ˙ Mt/Pt)e
−rtdt. (2.15)
We know π and m, and have already determined the left-hand side of (2.15). Given
our other results, the path of ˙ Mt/Pt is completely determined by γ. Because (2.15)
is a nonlinear equation in γ, we solve it numerically as described in the appendix.
Passive Monetary Policy We label our second example passive monetary policy.
In what follows we describe the mechanics of the example and explain why the labeling
is natural. We have assumed that government spending increases from G to Gt =
G + ψAin the period 0 ≤ t ≤ T. When government spending increases there is a
natural tendency for additional liquidity to be injected into the economy. Of course,
15in our example, the government is also cutting spending–on debt service. But debt
service payments are made in foreign currency. So a natural experiment is one in
which the government either accumulates reserves, with the savings from debt service,
or accumulates new debt less quickly. At the same time the government allows the
additional liquidity to ﬁnance its increased spending.20 Oﬀsetting this increase in
liquidity is any increase in taxes. Whatever new liquidity is not removed in the
form of new taxes represents new seigniorage revenue. The reason we call this passive
monetary policy is that the government will almost naturally ﬁnd itself in this position
if it increases domestic spending while reaping savings on the foreign exchange part
of its balance sheet.
In terms of our notation this means that the present value of new seigniorage
revenue raised between periods 0 and T is given by
  T
0








ω(Yt − Y )e
−rtdt. (2.16)
That is, new seigniorage through date T is equal to the diﬀerence between the present
value of new spending and the present value of new taxes through date T.T h er i g h t -
hand side of (2.16) is determined completely by our previous results. The left-hand
side of (2.16) is a nonlinear function of γ and ¯ γ, so (2.16) represents one equation in
our two unknowns, γ and ¯ γ.
An interesting implication of passive monetary policy is that it creates a link
between the amount of debt the government is left with at date T, and the amount
of debt relief it receives under the initiative. To see this, we can roll the budget





(ωYt − Gt + At + ˙ Mt/Pt)e
−rtdt. (2.17)
If we combine (2.16) and (2.17), and use the steady state condition (2.5), we obtain







20We have characterized the increase in spending for poverty reduction as an increase in govern-
ment purchases of domestic goods and services that causes an increase in domestic liquidity that the
government can respond to passively or actively. To the extent that increased spending on poverty
reduction is in the form of imports the diﬀerences between the two monetary policies will be less
stark, because increased expenditures on imports will not inject liquidity into the domestic economy.
16In other words, by the completion date of the initiative, the government’s debt has
been reduced by the capitalized value of the debt relief.
It is from this last result that we get our second equation to determine γ and ¯ γ.




(Ωt − Gt + At + ˙ Mt/Pt)e
−r(t−T)dt. (2.19)








( ˙ Mt/Pt − πm)e
−rtdt. (2.20)
This equation states that the present value (at date 0) of taxes and seigniorage raised
after date T can decline by the value of the debt relief package. The left-hand side
and the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (2.20) are determined by our previous
results. The seigniorage term in (2.20) is determined by ¯ γ.
So our strategy for solving the model under passive monetary policy is to solve
(2.20) numerically for ¯ γ. Then we solve (2.16) numerically for γ. This procedure is
described in more detail in the appendix.
In the next section of the paper we turn to a quantitative analysis of the model in
w h i c hw ec o m p a r et h ee ﬀects of the two monetary policies on the equilibrium paths
of prices, inﬂation and debt. We show how the two policies, active and passive, oﬀer
a distinct choice to the policy maker. We should be clear, however, that the point
we made in Section 1 pertains to all policy choices: given the conditionality of the
initiative, the present value of total revenues that the government must raise from
seigniorage and taxes will be unchanged relative to the initial steady state. If debt
relief is eﬀective in raising output, however, raising these revenues may be easier, in
the sense that the government may be able to obtain the same revenue with lower
tax rates and/or lower inﬂation. Here we have described a method for solving the
model where the tax rate ω is held ﬁxed. Thus, the indirect eﬀects of debt relief, in
our examples, all work through an increase in tax revenues, and an oﬀsetting decline
in seigniorage revenues.
173. Simulating the Model
Our main goals in this section are to (i) characterize the size of the indirect beneﬁcial
eﬀect of debt relief on tax revenue, and (ii) determine the paths of the price level,
the inﬂation rate, and the government’s debt under diﬀerent monetary policies. To
achieve these goals we use a calibrated version of the model to explore its properties
under the two policy regimes described above. We discuss the sensitivity of our results
to our assumptions at the end of this section.
3.1. Calibration
Our ﬁrst step is to calibrate some of our parameters. We set the real interest rate,
r =0 .05. We set the interest elasticity of money demand to η =0 .5. This value seems
broadly consistent with the estimates of interest elasticities reported by Easterly,
Mauro, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995) for developing countries. While our quantitative
ﬁndings are sensitive to this choice, our qualitative ﬁndings are invariant to it. We
normalize output as Y =1 . We set a, the constant in the Cagan money demand
function, to be a value consistent with real balances being 25 percent of GDP in
az e r oi n ﬂation economy. Notice that our model predicts that in such an economy
Mt/(PtYt)=ea−ηr, so that we set a = ηr +l n ( 0 .25) ≈− 1.36.
We set the initial level of government debt at D =0 .7Y ,o r7 0p e r c e n to fG D P .W e
let steady state government purchases G =0 .2Y . We assume that the government
runs a primary deﬁcit in the absence of aid inﬂows. That is, we set ω =0 .15,s ot h a t
in the initial steady state Ω = ωY< G . We assume that in the initial steady state,
the government receives an aid inﬂow of 3 percent of GDP. I.e. A =0 .03Y .
Our assumptions regarding the initial values of D, G, Ω,a n dA determine the
initial steady state inﬂation rate and the level of real balances. We have set these
values to be such that the government’s initial ﬁscal position is relatively weak–it
requires a high inﬂation rate, and considerable amounts of seigniorage to close its
budget constraint. In particular, given our parameter values, steady state seigniorage
is given by
mπ = rD + G − Ω − A =0 .055Y
18or 5.5 percent of GDP. The steady state inﬂation rate is about 25 percent.21 Steady
state real balances are m ≈ 0.22Y .22
We assume that the HIPC initiative increases aid to our ﬁctitious country over
a 10 year period, i.e. T =1 0 . We set ψ ≈ 0.9, so that the capitalized value of the
forgiven debt service is equal to 50 percent of the country’s initial stock of debt, i.e.
we set Aψ(erT − 1)/r =0 .5D0 =0 .35Y . Our assumptions about ψmeans that the
country receives a ﬂow of debt relief of about 2.7 percent of GDP over the life of the
initiative.
In choosing the parameters of the production technology described earlier, we seek
a reasonable upper bound for the indirect eﬀects of debt relief with HIPC condition-
ality. We set δ, the depreciation rate, equal to 0.1. We make relatively generous
assumptions about the productivity of aid in generating additional output.23 We
assume that all aid is invested, i.e. α =1 , and that the output-capital ratio is 0.5,
i.e. ρ =0 .5. These seem like generous assumptions to us for the following reason.
Suppose we ﬁnd the value of λ such that
  ∞
0
[Yt − Y − (Gt − G)]e
−λtdt =0 .
λ is the rate of return on the increased social spending, since it is the discount rate
that renders the present value of the ﬂow of investment equal to the present value of




















It is straightforward to show that the solution to this equation is
λ = ρα − δ.
21That steady state inﬂation is relatively high is not crucial to our analysis. As we discussed in the
previous section, a government in ﬁnancial distress may not close the budget constraint by printing
money. It may, instead, default or run arrears on its debt. How the government chooses to close
the budget constraint in the pre-debt relief steady state does not aﬀect our results concerning the
post-debt relief paths of prices and debt.
22Having the real monetary base this large is probably counterfactual. However, it is not critical
to our qualitative results. In fact, the smaller the monetary base in the steady state, the sharper
our results would be: passive monetary policy would be more destabilizing.
23For results concerning the eﬀectiveness of foreign aid, see Boone (1996) and Burnside and Dollar
(2000).
19So, our benchmark example is one in which λ =0 .4, i.e. the rate of return on social
spending is 40 percent. We think this is likely an upper bound for what is plausible
given the results in Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman
(2003).
3.2. The Lifetime Budget Constraint: Quantitative Results
In Section 1 we emphasized a result, concerning the lifetime budget constraint, that
was summarized by equation (1.6). This equation states that, with debt relief, the
sum of lifetime seigniorage plus tax revenue will be the same as it would have been in
the absence of debt relief. Because we have assumed that the tax rate, ω, is unchanged
after debt relief, this means that
  ∞
0




ω(Yt − Y )e
−rtdt (3.1)
The government can reduce the seigniorage it collects by the amount of its increased
tax receipts. We think of this reduction in seigniorage as the extent to which the
government budget constraint is indirectly relaxed by debt relief. Using (2.12) we
can see that (3.1) can be rewritten
  ∞
0





In our calibrated examples ωρα/(δ + r) is equal to 0.5, so that the relaxation of the
lifetime budget constraint represents 17.5 percent of GDP. This represents about 25
percent of the country’s initial stock of debt, about 16 percent of lifetime seigniorage in
the steady state, or about 5.8 percent of lifetime tax revenue. In this sense, the indirect
eﬀects of debt relief on the government’s lifetime budget constraint are relatively
modest, especially since we think our assumptions about ρ and α are generous.
3.3. Active Monetary Policy
In Section 2 we described an active monetary policy under which the government acts
to maintain a constant inﬂation rate for t ≥ 0. Figure 1 illustrates simulated paths
of inﬂation, the money growth rate, real balances, government debt, foreign aid and
seigniorage given the parameter values we selected above. Notice that, in the absence
20of the growth eﬀect, the economy would never move away from its initial steady state,
as indicated by the dashed lines in the ﬁgure.
The interesting dynamics in Figure 1 are generated by the growth eﬀect. As we
mentioned above, lifetime tax revenue rises by 17.5 percent of initial GDP. As a result,
lifetime seigniorage can decline by about the same amount. This is reﬂe c t e di nt h e
slightly lower inﬂation rate after debt relief: about 21 percent, versus 25 percent in the
initial steady state. The decline in inﬂation is small because the increase in lifetime
tax revenue only represents about one sixth of steady state lifetime seigniorage.
In the long-run the stock of debt is permanently reduced by the indirect eﬀects of
the debt relief initiative. By how much is debt reduced in the long-run? To answer
this question we note that in the very long-run, output returns to its steady state
level, Y ,s ot h a tf o rl a r g et,t h eﬂow budget constraint is approximately
˙ Dt = rDt + G − ωY − A − γ ¯ m
where ¯ m = ea−η(r+¯ γ)Y . Thus, the stock of debt the economy converges to in the limit
is
DA =
ωY − G + A +¯ γ ¯ m
r
= D0 +
¯ γ ¯ m − πm
r
.
Given our parameter values DA ≈ 0.55Y , as compared to the initial stock of debt
D0 ≈ 0.7Y .
3.4. Passive Monetary Policy
Figure 2 illustrates simulated paths under passive monetary policy. Again, we show
simulated paths with and without the indirect growth eﬀect. Both paths indicate
that there is a temporary rise in inﬂation during the period of increased aid and
government spending on poverty reduction. As we stated above, the rise in inﬂation
occurs because there is an instantaneous increase in liquidity that accompanies the
increase in government spending. When there is no growth eﬀect, all of this addi-
tional liquidity stays in the system and is reﬂected in higher seigniorage revenue and
inﬂation. When there is a growth eﬀect, some of the additional liquidity leaves the
system in the form of increasing tax payments, so the short-run inﬂation eﬀect is
weaker. In our numerical examples, the inﬂation rate jumps from about 25 percent in
21the steady state to about 40 percent, if we ignore the growth eﬀect. With the growth
eﬀect, inﬂation only rises to 33 percent in the short-run.
Of course, in the long-run the eﬀect on inﬂation is reversed. This occurs because
the short-run increase in seigniorage revenue leads to a rapid decline in debt. In fact,
as we saw above, passive monetary policy naturally leads to a halving of the debt
s t o c kb yt i m eT. This means that once government spending goes back to its previous
levels, the amount of seigniorage needed to close the government budget constraint is
greatly reduced. If we ignore the growth eﬀect, the long-run inﬂation rate is about 16
percent. With the growth eﬀect, the long-run inﬂation rate is only 14 percent. Again,
the growth eﬀect reduces the inﬂa t i o nr a t eb e c a u s et h ei n c r e a s ei nt a xr e v e n u ea l l o w s
seigniorage revenue to be lower.
How much does debt decline in the long-run with passive monetary policy? For
the same reasons given in the previous section, the long-run level of government debt
is given by
DP = D0 +
¯ γ ¯ m − πm
r
.
When there are no growth eﬀects, DP =0 .35Y . Debt is halved and the government
reaches its new steady state level of indebtedness at time T. On the other hand,
growth eﬀects contribute to a further reduction in debt, to DP =0 .26Y .
3.5. Summary Discussion
From these simulations we take away the message that debt relief that comes with
conditionality requiring increased government spending is likely to have the following
consequences:
1. At best, there would only be a modest relaxation of the government’s lifetime
budget constraint due to increased real activity and tax revenues.
2. Under passive monetary policy, debt and inﬂation could be substantially re-
duced in the long-run, but at the cost of signiﬁcantly higher inﬂation during
the period of increased spending.
223. Under active monetary policy intervention, inﬂation is kept stable, but there
would only be modest long-run reductions in government debt and inﬂation.
How sensitive are our results to our calibration assumptions? We would like to
emphasize that in our view our result concerning the lifetime budget constraint rep-
resents an upper bound on how much it will be relaxed by debt relief of a given
magnitude. In our example, the government receives debt relief worth about 35 per-
cent of GDP, and taxes output at a rate of 15 percent. Given our assumptions about
the returns to aid, this leads to an increase in lifetime revenue equal to 17.5 percent of
GDP. This ﬁgure depends proportionally on the tax rate, and on the amount of debt
relief, but we think both of our assumptions in this regard are realistic. Furthermore,
we think our assumptions about the mapping from increased spending on poverty
reduction to real activity are generous, suggesting that our result represents an upper
bound.
We would also like to de-emphasize the quantitative aspects of our results concern-
ing the path of inﬂation, and put more emphasis on our qualitative ﬁndings. Under
passive policy a substantial increase in government spending leads to an increase in
inﬂation that is eventually reversed. We experimented with alternative parameter
values to see if we could eliminate the short-run rise in the inﬂa t i o nr a t ei nt h ee x -
ample with passive monetary policy. We found that in order to do so, we would need
to assume that aid had a 110 percent rate of return (almost 3 times the rate of re-
turn we assumed in our baseline example). Using active monetary policy, in contrast,
the government can stabilize inﬂation. Here our results are simply the mirror im-
age of Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) unpleasant monetarist arithmetic:w i t h o u tﬁscal
reforms ﬁghting inﬂa t i o ni nt h es h o r t - r u ni m p l i e si n ﬂation later. In our case, lower
inﬂa t i o ni nt h ef u t u r em e a n sh i g h e ri n ﬂation now. We think this qualitative result
would survive signiﬁcant modiﬁcations of our model.
Given the apparent limited revenue impact of increased spending on poverty re-
duction, our analysis points to the importance of reforms not directly linked to HIPC
conditionality. In particular, our analysis suggests that if HIPC countries are to see
signiﬁcant improvements in their ﬁscal positions, they must undertake signiﬁcant ﬁs-
23cal reforms under which they cut other forms of spending as they raise spending on
poverty reduction. Returning to our numerical example, suppose that at time 0 the
HIPC government implemented spending cuts symmetric to its increased spending on
poverty reduction programs. How would this change our conclusions about the im-
pact of debt relief on inﬂation and the stock of debt? The answer is straightforward:
since the spending cuts would ﬁnance the increased spending on poverty reduction,
there would be no net injection of liquidity into the economy. Figure 3 illustrates
simulations of this scenario with either passive or active monetary policy.24 With
active monetary policy there is a sharp and permanent drop in inﬂation and debt
is substantially reduced by the completion point (date T =1 0 ). Even with passive
monetary policy there would be a sizeable short-run decline in inﬂation, due to in-
creased tax receipts, followed by a further decline in inﬂation after time T.N o t i c e
that the monetary policy issues we highlighted previously are now much less impor-
tant: the paths of inﬂation are not dramatically diﬀerent across the two scenarios.
Furthermore, the long-run paths of debt are very similar. And, ﬁnally, the govern-
ment’s lifetime budget constraint is signiﬁcantly relaxed. It can ﬁnance itself with 33
percent less seigniorage revenue.
Some HIPC countries have already undertaken steps towards the types of reforms
we have indicated here. That is, they have not only increased spending on poverty
reduction, but they have done this in the context of an overall ﬁscal reform. Our
analysis suggests that they are the ones likely to successfully achieve long-run ﬁscal
sustainability.
4. Optimal Policy Considerations
Our result, that the HIPC initiative provides little debt relief, may seem puzzling
given that ﬁscal solvency is one of its primary stated objectives. In this section we
address this puzzle by sketching a model of the behavior of recipient governments and
24In this example we imagine that Gt = G for all t (because one category of spending rises while
another falls). The path of At is as before. We assume that output rises as in our other examples,
because the government is substituting growth-enhancing expenditure for consumption expenditure.
24donors.25 We think of recipient governments as having preferences over two types of
purchases, those directed towards poverty reduction, which we denote by g1,a n d
those related to other government programs, which we denote by g2. For simplicity,
suppose the government has standard preferences over these two types of purchases:
U(g1,g 2). To make things simple, abstract from seigniorage, and imagine a steady
state budget constraint pg1 + g2 + rb ≤ τ + a,w h e r ep i st h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fg1, r
is the eﬀective interest rate on b, the government’s stock of debt, τ is tax revenue
and a is foreign aid, which we treat, as above, as a pure grant. We abstract, for the
moment, from the government’s decisions regarding b and τ, and treat these as given.
We let x = τ + a − rb represent the government’s net resources.
We assume that donors have diﬀerent preferences than the local government, and
that to make things simple, they have no taste for g2.26 We imagine that donors like
g1, but face costs–pecuniary and political–in providing foreign aid.
Imagine a game in which the donors lead, by setting a, and that recipient govern-
ments follow by setting g1 and g2, to maximize U,t a k i n gp, τ, a and rb as given. The
recipient government will choose g1 and g2 consistent with U1/U2 = p and pg1+g2 = x.
Hence, g1 is the solution to
U1(g1,x− pg1)/U2(g1,x− pg1)=p. (4.1)
The solution to the government’s problem is characterized in Figure 4(a). The gov-
ernment chooses the point (g∗
1,g ∗
2).
The donor, of course, in setting a, will take the recipient government’s rule for
choosing g1 into account. If the recipient government’s decision rule is g1 = γ(a),t h e
donor will maximize γ(a)−C(a),w h e r eC(a) represents the donors’ cost of providing
aid. As long as γ(a) is increasing and quasi-concave in a,a n dC(a) is increasing and
convex in a, the donor will choose a = a∗,w h e r eγ (a∗)=C (a∗).
One interpretation of the HIPC initiative is that it is an attempt by the donors to
increase g1 by changing the nature of this strategic game. Notice that donors might
perceive the recipient’s preference for g2 as the main barrier to increased spending
25Our sketched model resembles, in some respects, the model in Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2003)
26We do not take a stand on whether the government’s or the donor’s preferences are more
representative of the utility functions of households in the recipient country.
25on poverty reduction.27 If the recipient’s marginal propensity to purchase g1 out
of additional resources, namely γ (a), were higher, the donors would be willing to
p r o v i d em o r ea i d .
O n ew a yt h ed o n o r sc o u l dr e s t r u c t u r et h eg a m ew o u l db et oo ﬀer the recipient
government a deal: if you increase pg1 by at least ∆ relative to your current level of
spending pg∗
1, we will provide you with increased aid, or reduced debt service, in the
amount ∆. This amounts to a change in the budget set of the recipient government
like the one illustrated by the thick line in Figure 4(b). As long as the government’s
preferences are increasing in g1 it will accept this deal, and if g1 and g2 are both normal
goods, it will choose the corner solution (g∗
1 +∆/p,g∗
2). As long as the increase in g1
pleases the donor more than it costs to increase aid, the donor will be happy to make
the oﬀer as described.
In our discussion to this point, the level of indebtedness has been notably absent.
We have simply treated the level of debt, b, and the government’s sources of revenue,
τ and a,a sﬁxed parameters. Imagine, now, that the resource envelope is redeﬁned
as x = τ + a + d − rb,w h e r ed is arrears. We think it is quite reasonable to think of
arrears as ﬁnancing the government in steady state, since many HIPC governments
have had problems servicing their debts for a very long time.
Notice that when arrears enter the picture in this way, we can see that implicit
in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) is the assumption that the government’s propensity to use
arrears to close its budget constraint is unaﬀected by the donor’s oﬀer. To see this,
imagine that governments choose their levels of taxation and arrears (a form of de-
fault) optimally given a trade-oﬀ between the costs of raising taxes and running
arrears, and the beneﬁts of government spending. That is, suppose we think of a
government choosing g1, g2, τ and d, to maximize U(g1,g 2) − V (d,τ) subject to
pg1 + g2 = τ + a + d − rb,w h e r eV is an increasing and convex function describing
the costs of taxes and default.
27It is frequently argued, for example in Van Trotsenburg and MacArthur (1999), that debt itself
is the primary barrier to increased spending on poverty reduction. However, if debt itself were the
only problem, the donors could simply unconditionally cancel debt, or increase aid. Given that
donors do not generally do this, we presume they are concerned with how these resources will be
used.
26At the point (g∗
1 +∆/p,g∗
2) t h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ st o t a la r r e a r sa n dt a x e sa n d ,p r e s u m -
ably, the costs associated with them, are the same as at the point (g∗
1,g∗
2), because
t h ei n c r e a s ei ng1 is ﬁnanced entirely with additional aid. If U is additively separable
over g1 and g2, then the government has no incentive to reduce or increase its use of
arrears or taxes.28 So, the donor’s strategy induces an increase in g1 while leaving the
recipient’s propensity to default and/or use arrears as ﬁnancing unchanged. It also
has no eﬀect on the government’s choice of taxes nor on its choice of g2.
Why would donors consider such a strategy? One possibility is that the donor
does not view defaults, or the running of arrears, by recipient governments as very
costly on the margin. This means that were the donor to provide more resources to
the recipient government, the gain from doing so would be small. This does not seem
plausible to us, given the large literature that explores the costs of high indebtedness
in developing countries and given the emphasis that oﬃcial HIPC initiative documents
p u to nd e b tr e d u c t i o n . 29
Another possibility is that donors recognize the welfare costs of high indebtedness,
but perceive that these costs do not concern, or are not borne by, the recipient
governments. In this situation moral hazard would make it very diﬃcult to devise a
strategy that would relieve debt and not, at the same time, simply lead to an increase
in g2 rather than a decrease in d. In this case, a strategy of tying increased resources
to increased spending on g1, one which, in a sense, provides no debt relief at all, could
be preferred by the donors.30
Our point is not to argue that actual donor behavior is suboptimal. Rather we
want to point out that implicit in the HIPC initiative’s design is an objective function
that puts little weight on reducing debt, per se. This is important when thinking
28The marginal utility of g2 and the marginal costs of τ and d would be unchanged at the corner
solution (g∗
1+∆/p,g∗
2) under additive separability. Thus, the government would continue to consider
its choices for these variables as optimal.
29On the costs of high indebtedness see, among many, the discussions in Greene (1989), Sachs
(1989) and Agénor and Montiel (1996, Ch. 13). Many oﬃcial documents relating to the HIPC
initiative discuss the importance of debt reduction. Van Trotsenburg and MacArthur (1999) is an
excellent example.
30Of course, moral hazard could also be the reason indebted countries became indebted in the
ﬁrst place. The evidence, for example from Easterly (2002) and Kraay and Nehru (2003), is mixed
as to whether this is an important consideration.
27about how to assess the HIPC initiative, ex-post. Our results would suggest that the
initiative can only really be judged on its success in reducing poverty, in that on a
priori g r o u n d si ts h o u l dh a v el i t t l ei m p a c to nﬁscal solvency. Given the emphasis put
on debt in oﬃcial HIPC initiative documents, and in current policy debates about
the initiative, we presume this point has been overlooked.
Our other results, concerning active versus passive monetary policy have a diﬀerent
ﬂavor. Rather than focusing on the overall resource envelope, these results pertain
more towards macroeconomic management. Little attention has been paid to the
macroeconomic impact of the HIPC initiative. Our goal in discussing the possible
inﬂationary impact of the initiative was simply to point out that stabilization policy
becomes an issue when the government increases domestic spending. This does not
imply any statement, on our part, that active policy should be preferred to passive
policy. However, our results do suggest that, at a minimum, inﬂation outcomes will
be diﬀerent under the two regimes.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have discussed the potential macroeconomic impact of the HIPC
initiative. A central point of our paper is that the HIPC initiative provides only
modest amounts of debt relief to heavily indebted poor countries.
Our analysis also suggests that short-run inﬂationary pressure might arise as a
result of increased domestic spending for poverty reduction. Some recipient countries
may be ill-equipped to deal with these pressures and could experience a substantial
temporary increase in inﬂation. While our model does not capture the eﬀect, this
increase in inﬂation could impact negatively on growth. Our model suggests that
recipient countries can use monetary policy to stabilize inﬂation, but, in doing so,
they will tend to limit the longer run impact of the HIPC initiative on their debt
l e v e l s . W eh a v ea l s os h o w nt h a tt h ei m p a c to ni n ﬂation will be lower if increased
government spending produces favorable output eﬀects.
The concerns we have raised will be less relevant when the recipient country has
already achieved signiﬁcant progress in macroeconomic stabilization. In those cases
28where the recipient government has already implemented ﬁscal reforms that would
enable it to reduce its debt level over time, the risk of short-run inﬂation will be
diminished and longer run ﬁscal sustainability will be ensured. But, in these sorts
of countries, there is almost certainly less need, on the parts of donors, to attach
conditions to debt relief.
A major shortcoming of our analysis is that our simple analytical framework does
not allow us to explore more fully the impact of debt relief on real activity, the real
exchange rate, and the external current account. In future research, we intend to
extend our analysis to deal with these issues, using a general equilibrium small-open-
economy model.
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Notes: In these examples, the government actively smoothes inflation over time.  The 
solid lines indicate the paths of each variable assuming that the increased spending on 
poverty reduction raises output.  The dashed lines indicate what these paths would be in 
the absence of this additional growth.  So the dashed lines indicate the direct effect of 
debt relief with HIPC conditionality, while the solid lines indicate the combination of the 
direct and indirect effects. The scales for real balances, debt, aid and seignorage can all 
be interpreted by noting that GDP = 1.  The inflation and money growth rates are 
expressed in decimal form. 
 











































































Notes: In these examples, the government does not actively intervene to smooth inflation. 
It allows the liquidity associated with the increase in government spending to stay in the 
economy to the extent that increased tax revenues do not remove it.  The solid lines 
indicate the paths of each variable assuming that the increased spending on poverty 
reduction raises output.  The dashed lines indicate what these paths would be in the 
absence of this additional growth.  So the dashed lines indicate the direct effect of debt 
relief with HIPC conditionality, while the solid lines indicate the combination of the 
direct and indirect effects. The scales for real balances, debt, aid and seignorage can all 
be interpreted by noting that GDP = 1.  The inflation and money growth rates are 
expressed in decimal form. 










































SIMULATIONS WITH ADDITIONAL FISCAL REFORMS 
 
 






























Notes: In these examples, the government implements spending cuts symmetric to its 
spending increase over the life of the debt relief initiative. The solid lines indicate the 
paths of each variable assuming that the increased spending on poverty reduction raises 
output.  The dashed lines indicate what these paths would be in the absence of this 
additional growth.  So the dashed lines indicate the direct effect of debt relief with HIPC 
conditionality, while the solid lines indicate the combination of the direct and indirect 
effects. The scales for real balances, debt, aid and seignorage can all be interpreted by 
noting that GDP = 1.  The inflation and money growth rates are expressed in decimal 
form. 


































THE RECIPIENT GOVERNMENT’S OPTIMAL DECISIONS  
 
(a) Prior to Debt Relief 
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For any function eψx
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ψxdx = C +( x − 1/ψ)(e
ψx/ψ) (6.2)


































−b/η − (a + η)e
−a/η]. (6.4)
Solving the Cagan Model T h es o l u t i o nt ot h eC a g a nm o d e lg i v e ni n( 2 . 3 )i s







Given the monetary policy described in (2.13), for 0 ≤ t ≤ T we have:















= ηr − a +l n ( M0/Y0)+γ(t + η) − η(γ − ¯ γ)e
(t−T)/η. (6.6)
On the other hand, for t>Twe have








= ηr − a +l n ( M0/Y0)+( γ − ¯ γ)T +¯ γ (t + η). (6.7)
Hence the inﬂation rate for 0 ≤ t ≤ T is
πt =˙ pt = γ − (γ − ¯ γ)e
(t−T)/η
while for t ≥ T it is simply πt =¯ γ.
36Details of the Analysis in Section 2
Active Monetary Policy







(πm − ˙ Mt/Pt)e
−rtdt. (6.8)
Given (2.13), (6.6) and (6.7) we know that Pt = e−a+η(r+γ)(M0/Y0)eγt,a n dt h a t
˙ Mt =( M0/Y0)eγt ˙ Yt + γ(M0/Y0)eγtYt. Therefore, ˙ Mt/Pt = ea−η(r+γ)( ˙ Yt + γYt).G i v e n






















































We solve (6.9) numerically for γ.
Passive Monetary Policy
In this section we describe how we solve for γ and ¯ γ under passive monetary
policy. The ﬁr s ts t e pi no u ra n a l y s i si st os o l v e( 2 . 2 0 )f o r¯ γ.G i v e n ( 2 . 1 3 ) a n d
(6.7) we have Pt = eη(r+¯ γ)−a(M0/Y0)e(γ−¯ γ)T+¯ γt and ˙ Mt = ˙ Yt(M0/Y0)eγT+¯ γ(t−T) +
¯ γYt(M0/Y0)eγT+¯ γ(t−T) for t ≥ T.H e n c e ,f o rt>T, ˙ Mt/Pt = ea−η(r+¯ γ)( ˙ Yt +¯ γYt).T h i s




























37We solve (6.10) numerically for ¯ γ.
Next we solve (2.16) for γ.T od ot h i sw en o t et h a t( 2 . 1 3 )a n d( 6 . 6 )i m p l yPt =
eη(r+γ)−a(M0/Y0)exp(γt−η(γ − ¯ γ)e(t−T)/η) and ˙ Mt =( M0/Y0)eγt ˙ Yt +γ(M0/Y0)eγtYt




γY + ˙ Yt + γ(Yt − Y )
eη(r+γ)−a exp(−η(γ − ¯ γ)e(t−T)/η)
.
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exp[−(r + δ)t + η(γ − ¯ γ)e
(t−T)/η]dt. (6.11)






































Using (6.11)—(6.14) we can solve (2.16) numerically for γ given ¯ γ.
Details of the Analysis in Section 3
Simulations in Figures 1 and 2
In the previous subsection of the appendix, we have shown how to obtain the
equilibrium values of γ and ¯ γ. Given the path of output, γ and ¯ γ completely determine
the paths of Mt and Pt. In some of our simulations we also would like to have







(ωYs − Gs + As + ˙ Ms/Ss)e
−rsds (6.15)
38We note that (2.5) lets us rewrite this as
Dt = D0 − e
rt
   t
0








We can write the ﬁrst integral in (6.16) as
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0

















re−t(δ+r) − e−rt(r + δ)+δ
(δ + r)r
(6.17)
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δ(1 − e−rT)+re−t(δ+r)(1 − eδT)
(δ + r)r
. (6.20)






















The ﬁrst part of the right-hand side of (6.21) can be evaluated using (6.18) (at t = T).











































Simulations in Figure 3
In this section we imagine that Gt = G,f o rt ≥ 0. The paths of At and Yt are the
same as in our other examples. We now show how to solve the model under active
and passive monetary policy.
Under active monetary policy the government chooses the single parameter of
monetary policy, γ =¯ γ, to satisfy its lifetime budget constraint, (1.2). With our new








The ﬁrst part of this expression is given by (2.12). The second part is given by (2.8).
The negative of the third part appears on the right-hand side of (6.9). Combining

























which we solve for γ.
Under passive monetary policy we need to replace (2.16) by
  T
0




ω(Yt − Y )e
−rtdt (6.24)
since there is no natural injection of liquidity. If we combine (6.24) and (2.17), and
use the steady state condition (2.5), we again obtain (2.18). We also obtain (2.20)
as in Section 2. This immediately implies that the solution for ¯ γ i st h es a m ea s
before. But the solution for γ is diﬀerent. To solve for γ, using (6.24) we note that
the expressions in (6.11), (6.12) and (6.14) can be used.
To simulate the path of debt under either scenario we note that the previous
formulas apply with one exception. The path of debt for 0 ≤ t ≤ T follows
Dt = D0 − e
rt
   t
0













0(At − A)e−rsds = ψA(1 − e−rt)/r.
40